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Independent Orbiter Assessment
Analysis of the Instrumentation Subsystem
1.0 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company (MDAC) was selected in
June 1986 to perform an Independent Orbiter Assessment (IOA) of
the Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and Critical Items
List (CIL). Direction was given by the STS Orbiter and GFE
Projects Office to perform the hardware analysis using the
instructions and ground rules defined in NSTS 22206, Instructions
for Preparation of FMEA and CIL, i0 October 1986. The IOA
a-_roachfeatures a t-_-d--o-wna-n-alysis of the h-_dware to
determine failure modes, criticality, and potential critical
items. To preserve independence, this analysis was accomplished
without reliance upon the results contained within the NASA
FMEA/CIL documentation. This report documents (Appendix C) the
independent analysis results for the Instrumentation Subsystem.
The Instrumentation Subsystem (hereafter referred to as the
subsystem or SS) consists of transducers, signal conditioning
equipment, pulse code modulation (PCM) encoding equipment, tape
recorders, frequency division multiplexers, and timing equipment.
For this analysis, the SS is broken into two major groupings:
Operational Instrumentation (OI) equipment and Modular Auxiliary
Data System (MADS) equipment.
The OI equipment is required to acquire, condition, scale,
digitize, interleave/multiplex, format, and distribute
operational Orbiter and payload data and voice for display,
recording, telemetry, and checkout. It also must provide
accurate timing for time-critical functions for crew and payload
specialist use.
The MADS provides additional instrumentation to measure and
record selected pressure, temperature, strain, vibration, and
event data for post-flight playback and analysis. There is no
real-time telemetry of MADS data. MADS data is used to assess
vehicle responses to the flight environment and to permit
correlation of such data from flight to flight, as well as with
the Development Flight Instrumentation (DFI) data gathered by
OV102 during Orbital Flight Test (OFT).
The IOA analysis utilized available SS hardware drawings and
schematics for identifying hardware assemblies and components and
their interfaces. Criticality for each item was assigned on the
basis of the worst-case effect of the failure modes identified.
Figure 1 presents a summary by category of the failure
criticalities for the SS, and individually for the two major
groupings of the SS (OI and MADS). Figure 2 gives details on the
OI group. Because all failure modes for MADS are 3/3, it is not
broken down by element as is the OI in Figure 2. A tabular
summary is also presented below, giving total count for each of
the modes identified, and an overall count.
4 -+
Summary of IOA Failure Modes By Criticality (HWIF)
Criticality: I 1/1Number : -
2/IR 2/2
1 7
3/IR 3/2R
6 20
313
54
TOTAL
88
+ +
For each failure mode identified, the criticality and redundancy
screens were examined to identify candidate items for the Critical
Items List (CIL). A summary of potential CIL items is presented
below:
Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items (HW/F)
Criticality: [ i/INumber : -
2/1R 2/2
1 7 3/IR[_ 3/2R
TOTAL
8
Potential CIL items identified for the SS were the MTU, the PCMMU
format control switch, the PCMMU power switch, and MDMs OAf, OA2,
and 0A3.
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........ I
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CRITICALITY #FM #PCI
1/1 0 0
2tlR 1 1
2t2 7 7
311R 6 0
312R 20 0
3/3 54 0
_ _' ±± , _ .............
" IIII I
OI
CRITICALITY #FM #PCI
1/1 0 0
2/1R 1 1
2/2 7 7
3ttr 6 0
3/2R 20 0
3/3 22 0
MADS
CRITICALITY #FM
3/3 32
#PCI
0
FIGURE 1
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CRIT.
2t2
211R
I
MTU
#FM
3
1
#PCI
3
0
PDI
CRIT. #FM
3f2R 4
#PCI
0
PCMMU/SWs
CRIT. #FM #PCI
2t2 4 4
3/2R 3 0
3/3 1 0
OPS RCDR
CRIT. #FM #PCI
3/3 4 0
MDM
CRIT. #FM #PCl
2/1R 1 1
311R 2 0
3t2R 4 0
3/3 1 0
P/L RCDR
CRIT. #FM #PCI
312R 5 0
DSC
CRIT. #FM #PCl
3/1R 4 0
3/2R 3 0
313 5 0
OTB
CRIT. #FM
3/3 3
#PCl
0
PTB
CRIT. #FM #PCl
3t3 3 0
SENSORS
CRIT. #FM #PCI
3/3 5 0
FIGURE 2
i •
2.0 INTRODUCTION
2.1 Purpose
The 51-L Challenger accident prompted the NASA to readdress
safety policies, concepts, and rationale being used in the
National Space Transportation System (NSTS). The NSTS Office has
undertaken the task of reevaluating the FMEA/CIL for the Space
Shuttle design. The MDAC is providing an independent assessment
of the Orbiter FMEA/CIL for completeness and technical accuracy.
2.2 Scope
The independent FMEA/CIL assessment activity encompasses those
Shuttle Orbiter subsystems and GFE hardware identified in the
Space Shuttle Independent FMEA/CIL Assessment Contractor
Statement of Work. Each subsystem analysis addresses hardware,
functions, internal and external interfaces, and operational
requirements for all mission phases.
2.3 Analysis Approach
The approach is to use a top-down analysis utilizing available
drawings and other documentation to break the subsystem down into
major components and lower-level subassembly or hardware items.
That documentation is listed in the individual failure mode
analysis sheets, and supplementary documentation is shown in
Section 5. The detailed steps in the analysis are summarized in
Steps I, 2, and 3 below. Step 4 will be used in the assessment
to be performed at a later date, wherein the results of the
analysis will be compared with the NASA and Prime Contractor
FMEAs/CIL, and any residual unresolved issues will be reported.
Step 1.0 Subsystem familiarization
i.I Define subsystem functions
1.2 Define subsystem components
1.3 Define subsystem specific ground rules and
assumptions
Step 2.0 Define subsystem analysis diagram
2.1 Define subsystem
2.2 Define major assemblies
2.3 Develop detailed subsystem representations
Step 3.0 Failure events definition
3.1 Construct matrix of failure modes
3.2 Document I0A analysis results
Step 4.0 Compare IOA analysis data to NASA FMEA/CIL
4.1 Resolve differences
4.2 Review in-house
4.3 Document assessment issues
4.4 Forward findings to Project Manager
2.4 Instrumentation Subsystem Ground Rules and Assumptions
The ground rules and assumptions used in the SS analysis and
assignment of criticalities are given in Appendix B. Subsystem-
specific ground rules were set up to limit the analysis to
single-point failures for each failure mode.
3.0 SUBSYSTEMDESCRIPTION
3.1 Design and Function
The subsystem consists of the hardware required for data
acquisition, conditioning, timing, formatting, and routing for
checkout and display as needed, and for recording or downlinking
by telemetry as required.
3.1.1 Operational Instrumentation
l • Sensors and transducers acquire data representing
measurements or status of individual parameters
throughout the vehicle and convert quantities
sensed to electrical signals.
. Signal conditioners normalize or standardize the
sensor outputs either to a range for analog
measurements or to set levels for discretes
(ON/OFF, HIGH/LOW). There are 13 Dedicated Signal
Conditioners (DSCs) handling approximately 1200
individual measurement channels•
• Reference junctions provide a reference potential
for a known temperature for thermocouple sensors.
. The seven OI Multiplexer/Demultiplexers (MDMs)
format incoming data from signal conditioners and
feed it into the OI data buses, which in turn
route the formatted data to the active PCMMU.
, The active Pulse Code Modulation Master Unit
(PCMMU) accepts incoming data from the OI MDMs,
combines that data with GPC downlist data and
payload data (if any) from the PDI. The PCMMU
formats the data into a serial bit stream and
routes it to the communications subsystem for
further processing/routing. (A "cold-standby"
PCMMU is available as backup).
. The Master Timing Unit (MTU) is a very stable and
accurate source of timing for Orbiter and payload
operations• It provides time in IRIG B GMT and
IRIG B MET formats, and also provides
synchronizing/timing signals for many Orbiter
LRUs.
• The Orbiter Timing Buffer (OTB) amplifies and
splits one IRIG B GMT signal and one IRIG B MET
signal to produce eight GMT and four MET outputs
for use by the Orbiter•
• The Payload Timing Buffer (PTB) performs the same
functions as the OTB, but for payload users.
. Two operational tape recorders are used to
alternately record and dump OI data and voice.
They are identical 14-track wideband units capable
of recording analog or digital data and voice.
i0. The Payload Recorder (PLR) is identical to the
two Ops recorders, and is used to record payload
data.
3.1.2 Modular Auxiliary Data System
i • Sensors and transducers perform the same function
for MADS as for OI.
, Strain Gage Signal Conditioners (SGSCs) accept the
outputs of completion bridges and condition the
signals for handover to the MADS PCM Mux.
• The PCMU accepts outputs from the SGSCs and
multiplexes, encodes, and formats the data for
output to the T-O umbilical or to the MADS Control
Module (MCM) for further routing to the MADS
recorder•
• Wideband Signal Conditioners (WBSCs) handle high-
frequency signals and with wide variations in
output amplitude, such as from transducers sensing
vibratory, acoustic, and POGO phenomena•
. The Frequency Division Multiplexer (FDM) accepts
WBSC outputs. Each individual channel measurement
signal modulates a voltage-controlled oscillator
(VCO) subcarrier signal• The individual modulated
VCO subcarriers are summed and the composite FDM
output is passed to the MADS Control Module (MCM)
for eventual routing to the MADS recorder.
, The MCM controls power to the various MADS LRUs
and selects recorder speeds, modes, tape
direction, tape tracks, and PCM Mux formats and
data rates.
3.2 Interfaces and Locations
The SS hardware is located throughout the Orbiter. OI and MADs
equipment locations are shown in Figures 3 and 4. Refer to Table
I for an overview of equipment locations• Figures 5 and 6 show
subsystem interfaces for OI and MADS, respectively•
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TABLE !- INSTRUMENTATION EQUIPMENT LOCATION
OI
OI
NOMENCLATURE
OF1
OF2
OF3
OF4
OA1
OA2
DSCs OA3
OM1
OM2
OL1
OI.2
OR1
INSTALLED
LOCATION
OI
NOMENCLATURE
INSTALLED
LOCATION
AV BAY 1
AV BAY 2
AV BAY 3
FWD RCS MODULE
AV BAY 4
AM BAY 5
AV BAY 6
MID FUSELAGE
MID FUSELAGE
LEFT OMS POD
LEFT OMS POD
RIGHT OM8 POD
PDI AV BAY 1
PCMMUs 1 AVBAY1
2 AV BAY 2
MTU AVBAY3B
OPS I AV BAY 2OR2 RIGHT OMS POD
......................... ,4 .........................
MDMs
RCDRs
OF1
OF2
OF3
OF4
OA1
OA2
OA3
OPS 2
AV BAY 1
AV BAY 2
AV BAY 3
FLTDECK
AV BAY 4
AV BAY 5
AV BAY 6
AV BAY 2
P/L AV BAY 1
L. ............................ , .........................
t
I
OTB BEHIND PANEL L16
PTB BEHIND PANEL L16
I
MADS
MADS I INSTALLEDNOMENCLATURE LOCATION
I
WBSC i MID BODY
....................... i..........................
I
SGSC I MID BODY
....................... J..........................
t
PCMU t MID BODY
....................... i..........................
FDM
, MID BODY
....................... I........................
POA i MID BODY
MCM i CABIN MIDDECK
I
....................... l..........................
RCDR t CABIN MIDDECK
[
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
EQUIPMENT LOCATION
®
Q
Q®
Q F'WD AVIONICS BAY 1 Q FLT DECK
DSC OM1 MDM OF4
MDM OFI
PC_IMU NO. I
P/L RCDR 7_ AFT AVIONICS BAY 4
P/L DATA INTERLEAVEFI DSC OA1
MDM OA1
Q FWD AVIONICS BAY 2
[8; AFT AVIONICS BAY 5DSC OF2
MDM OP2
PEA'WILl NO. 2 DSC OA2
OPS RCDR 1 MOM OA2
OPS RCDR 2
Q/Er AVIONICS BAY 6
Q FWD AVIONICS BAY 3A DSC OA3
L'3SCOF3 MDM OA3
MDM O1=3
Q LEFT/F_IGHT OMS PODS
G FWD AVIONICS BAY 3B DSC 0El
MTIJ DSC OL2
DSC OR1
Q FWD RCS DSCoR2
OSCOF4 ('_ MID BODY
DSC OM1
DSC OM2
FIGURE 3.
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WBSC
MID BODY MADS LOCATIONS
TD310
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! "_ ,. ",_-" " Yo 0.0
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module _'/. /.., " -:?-", : -= ='J-_' " ,_
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module
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Volume D
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FIGURE 4
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IOA
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FIGURE 6
3.3 Hierarchy
Figures 7, 8 and 9 depict the hierarchy of the major SS LRUs and
the related subassemblies. Figures I0 through 15 give detailed
subsystem LRU representations. Functional block diagrams for OI
and MADS are given in Figures 16 and 17.
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4.0 ANALYSIS RESULTS
Detailed analysis results for each of the identified failure
modes are presented in Appendix C. Table II presents a summary
of the failure criticalities. Further discussion of each of
these subdivisions and the applicable failure modes is provided
in subsequent paragraphs.
TABLE II Summary of IOA Failure Modes and Criticalities
Criticality:
MTU
PCMMU/SWITCHES
MDMs
DSCs
PDI
OPS RCDR
PL RCDR
OTB
PTB
MADS
SENSORS
TOTAL
i/i
m
w
2/IR
m
1
2/2
3
4
3/IR
2
4
3/2R
1
3
4
3
4
5
2O
3/3 TOTAL
m
1
1
5
4
3
3
32
5
4
8
8
12
4
4
5
3
3
32
5
8854
Of the 86 failure modes analyzed, 8 failures were determined to
be Potential Critical Items (PCIs) A summary of the PCIs is
presented in Table III. Appendix D presents a cross reference
between each PCI and a specific worksheet in Appendix C.
TABLE III Summary of IOA Potential Critical Items
Criticality:
MTU
PCMMU FORMAT
SWITCH
PCMMU PWR
SWITCH
MDM
i/i
m
2/IR
1
2/2
3
3
1
3/IR 3/2R TOTAL
3
3
1
1
I TOTAL
+
I - I i 1 7 - I - I
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4.1 Analysis Results, MTU
The MTU analysis considered four failure modes, of which three
modes were criticality 2/2. The MTU therefore is placed on the
PCI list.
4.2 Analysis Results, PCMMUPower and Mode Control Switches
Eight failure modes were considered for the PCMMUand associated
switches. Three failure modes concerned the PCMMUformat control
switch and one the PCMMUpower switch; all are criticality 2/2,
placing the two switches on the PCI list.
4.3 Analysis Results, MDMs
The analysis performed on the MDMsconsidered eight modes.
Critical fuel cell measurements place OAf, OA2, OA3 on the PCI
list.
4.4 Analysis Results, DSCs
The DSC analysis considered twelve failure modes. No DSCs fell
into the critical item category.
4.5 Analysis Results, PDI
Four failure modes were analyzed for the PDI, none of which put
it on the PCI list.
4.6 Analysis Results, OPS Recorders
The OPS recorders analysis considered four failure modes. None
placed the OPS recorders on the PCI list.
4.7 Analysis Results, P/L Recorder
Five failure modes were considered for the P/L recorder, none of
which placed it on the PCI list.
4.8 Analysis Results, OTB
The OTB analysis considered three failure modes; none causes it
to be a critical item.
4.9 Analysis Results, PTB
The PTB analysis considered three failure modes. None
classified the PTB as critical.
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4.10 Analysis Results, MADS
Thirty-two failure modes were analyzed for the MADS.
failures are 3/3, exempting it from the PCI list.
4.11 Analysis Results, Sensors
The sensors considered are all related to instrumentation
electrical power. Five failure modes were ahalyzed, none of
which places any of the sensors on the PCI list.
All MADS
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APPENDIX A
ACRONYMS
ACIP
AOA
ARPCS
AV
BFS
Calibr
CCTV
CIL
CRIT
DFI
DFL
Dk
DOD
DSC
EIU
Ena
ET
F
FASCOS
FDM
Flt
FMEA
Fwd
GMT
GPC
GSE
IFM
INCO/COMM
INST
IOA
ips
IRIG B
LRU
MADS
Man
MCM
MDAC
MDM
MET
MIA
MTU
MUX
NA
NASA
NSP
OA
OF
OI
OMRSD
Aerodynamics Coefficient Instrumentation Package
Abort Once Around
Atmospheric Revitalization Pressure Control System
Avionics
Backup Flight System
Calibration
Closed Circuit Television
Critical Items List
Criticality
Development Flight Instrumentation
Decommutator Format Load
Deck
Department of Defense
DedicatedSignal Conditioner
Engine Interface Unit
Enable
External Tank
Functional
Flight Acceleration Safety Cutoff System
Frequency Division Multiplexer
Flight
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis
Forward
Greenwich Meridien Time
General Purpose Computer
Ground Support Equipment
In-Flight Maintenance
Instrumentation and Communication Officer -
Communications
Instrumentation
Independent Orbiter Assessment
Inches per second
Interrange Instrumentation Group B-format
Line Replacement Unit
Modular Auxiliary Data System
Manual
MADS Control Module
McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company
Multiplexer/Demultiplexer
Mission Elapsed Time
Multiplexer Interface Adapter
Master Timing Unit
Multiplex
Not Applicable
National Aeronautics and Space Administration
Network Signal Processor (Communications Subsystem)
Operational Aft
Operational Forward
Operational Instrumentation
Operational Maintenance Requirements and
A-I
OMS
OPS
OTB
PCI
PCM
PCMMU
PCMU
PDA
PDI
PL,P/L
Pnl
POGO
PTB
PWR
QC
RTLS
SFOM
SGSC
SM
SPF
SRB
SSSH
STR
STS
SW
SYS
T-O
TAL
TFL
TPS
VCO
WBSC
Specifications Document
Orbital Maneuvering System
Operations, Operational
Orbiter Timing Buffer
Potential Critical Item
Pulse Code Modulation
PCM Master Unit (OI)
PCM Multiplexer Unit (MADS)
Power Distribution Assembly
Payload Data Interleaver
Payload
Panel
Acceleration/Vibration Along Thrust Axis
Payload Timing Buffer
Power
Quality Control
Return to Launch Site
Shuttle Flight Operations Manual
Strain Gage Signal Conditioner
Systems Management
Single Point of Failure
Solid Rocket Booster
Space Shuttle Systems Handbook
Shuttle Tape Recorder
Space Transportation System
Switch
System
Time Zero
Trans-Atlantic Abort Landing
Telemetry Format Load
Thermal Protection System
Voltage-Controlled Oscillator
Wideband Signal Conditioner
A-2
APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I
B.2
B.3
Definitions
Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
Subsystem-Specific Ground Rules and Assumptions
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUNDRULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.I Definitions
Definitions contained in NSTS 22206, Instructions For Preparation
of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, were used with the following
amplifications and additions.
INTACT ABORT DEFINITIONS:
RTLS - begins at transition to OPS 6 and ends at transition
to OPS 9, post-flight
TAL - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post-flight
AOA - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
_r-ansition to OPS 9, post-flight
ATO - begins at declaration of the abort and ends at
transition to OPS 9, post_flight
CREDIBLE (CAUSE) - an event that can be predicted or expected in
anticipated operational environmental conditions. Excludes an
event where multiple failures must first occur to result in
environmental extremes
CONTINGENCY CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
EARLY MISSION TERMINATION - termination of onorbit phase prior to
p--_ed end of mission
EFFECTS/RATIONALE - description of the case which generated the
highest criticality
HIGHEST CRITICALITY - the highest functional criticality
determined in the phase-by-phase analysis
MAJOR MODE (MM) - major sub-mode of software operational sequence
(OPS)
MC - Memory Configuration of Primary Avionics Software System
(PASS)
MISSION - assigned performance of a specific Orbiter flight with
payload/objective accomplishments including orbit phasing and
altitude (excludes secondary payloads such as GAS cans,
middeck P/L, etc.)
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MULTIPLE ORDER FAILURE - describes the failure due to a single
cause or ev_ of all units which perform a necessary (critical)
function
OFF-NOMINAL CREW PROCEDURES - procedures that are utilized beyond
the standard m--_function procedures, pocket checklists, and cue
cards
OPS - software operational sequence
PRIMARY MISSION OBJECTIVES - worst case primary mission objec-
tives are equal to mission objectives
PHASE DEFINITIONS:
PRELAUNCH PHASE - begins at launch count-down Orbiter
power-up an--_ ends at moding to OPS Major Mode 102 (liftoff)
LIFTOFF MISSION PHASE - begins at SRB ignition (MM 102) and
ends'at transition out of OPS 1 (Synonymous with ASCENT)
ONORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS 2 or OPS 8 and
ends at t-ransition out of OPS 2 or OPS 8
DEORBIT PHASE - begins at transition to OPS Major Mode
301 and ends at first main landing gear touchdown
LANDING/SAFING PHASE - begins at first main gear
touchdown and ends with the completion of post-landing
safing operations
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APPENDIX B
DEFINITIONS, GROUND RULES, AND ASSUMPTIONS
B.2 IOA Project Level Ground Rules and Assumptions
The philosophy embodied in NSTS 22206, Instructions for
Preparation of FMEA/CIL, i0 October 1986, was employe--d--with the
following amplifications and addition-{.
l ,
.
•
,
.
The operational flight software is an accurate
implementation of the Flight System Software Requirements
(FSSRs).
RATIONALE: Software verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
After liftoff, any parameter which is monitored by system
management (SM) or which drives any part of the Caution and
warning System (C&W) will support passage of Redundancy
Screen B for its corresponding hardware item.
RATIONALE: Analysis of on-board parameter availability
and/or the actual monitoring by the crew
is beyond the scope of this task.
Any data employed with flight software is assumed to be
functional for the specific vehicle and specific mission
being flown.
RATIONALE: Mission data verification is out-of-scope of
this task.
All hardware (including firmware) is manufactured and
assembled to the design specifications drawings.
RATIONALE: Acceptance and verification testing is
designed to detect and identify problems
before the item is approved for use.
All Flight Data File crew procedures will be assumed
performed as written, and will not include human error in
their performance.
RATIONALE: Failures caused by human operational error
are out-of-scope of this task.
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•
.
i0.
ii.
All hardware analyses will, as a minimum, be performed at
the level of analysis existent within NASA/Prime Contractor
Orbiter FMEA/CILs, and will be permitted to go to greater
hardware detail levels but not lesser.
RATIONALE: Comparison of IOA analysis results with
other analyses requires that both analyses
be performed to a comparable level of
detail•
Verification that a telemetry parameter is actually
monitored during AOS by ground-based personnel is not
required.
RATIONALE: Analysis of mission-dependent telemetry
availability and/or the actual monitoring of
applicable data by ground-based personnel is
beyond the scope of this task.
The determination of criticalities per phase is based on the
worst case effect of a failure for the phase being analyzed.
The failure can occur in the phase being analyzed or in
any previous phase, whichever produces the worst case
effects for the phase of interest.
RATIONALE: Assigning phase criticalities ensures a
thorough and complete analysis.
Analysis Of wire harnesses, cables, and electrical connectors
to determine if FMEAs are warranted will not be performed
nor FMEAs assessed.
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Analysis of welds or brazed joints that cannot be inspected
will not be performed nor FMEAs assessed•
RATIONALE: Analysis was substantially complete prior
to NSTS 22206 ground rule redirection.
Emergency system or hardware will include burst discs and
will exclude the EMU Secondary Oxygen Pack (SOP), pressure
relief valves and the landing gear pyrotechnics.
RATIONALE: Clarify definition of emergency systems to
ensure consistency throughout IOA project.
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•
•
•
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Instrumentation Subsystem - Specific Ground Rules and
Assumptions
Sensors and transducers and associated individual or
integral signal conditioners used within a subsystem will be
analyzed by specialists assessing that subsystem.
Rationale: The subsystem analyst is the person best
qualified to identify credible failure
modes/causes and to assess the effects/
criticalities of those failures.
Human error (e.g., misconfiguration by crew or ground) will
not be considered.
Rationale: Possible misconfigurations are out of scope
for this analysis•
Inadvertent misconfigurations (e.g., accidental body contact
by crew member with a switch in zero-g operations) will not
be considered.
Rationale: Most critical switches have guards, or are
lever-lock type. Possible inadvertent
misconfigurations are out of scope for this
analysis.
Hardware items have been properly qualified, have passed
applicable acceptance testing, and have been properly
installed in the Orbiter. Exception: if analysis of
LRU/subassembly/piece-part failure history discloses
multiple failures for a particular item, that item will be
individually examined for design/QC deficiencies, and will
be flagged for special attention.
Rationale: Baseline assumption is that program
controls have resulted in hardware that is
properly qualified and installed.
The criticality of an Instrumentation SS hardware item will
be assigned on the basis of the highest criticality of any
parameter or measurement traversing it.
Rationale: Instrumentation exists as a service to
other subsystems and to give insight into
their status; the criticality of any
path(s) within it is determined by the
criticality of measurements utilizing it.
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APPENDIX C
DETAILED ANALYSIS
This section contains the I0A analysis worksheets generated
during the analysis of this subsystem. The information on these
worksheets is intentionally similar to the NASA FMEAs. Each of
these sheets identifies the hardware item being analyzed, and
parent assembly, as well as the function. For each failure mode,
the possible causes are outlined, and the assessed hardware and
functional criticality for each mission phase is listed, as
described in the NSTS 22206, Instructions for Preparation of FMEA
and CIL, i0 October 1986. Finally, effects are entered at the
bottom of each sheet, _d the worst case criticality is entered
at the top.
LEGEND FOR IOAANALYSIS WORKSHEETS
Hardware Criticalities:
1 = Loss of life or vehicle
2 = Loss of mission or next failure of any redundant item
(like or unlike) could cause loss of life/vehicle
3 = All others
Functional Criticalities:
1R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of life or vehicle.
2R = Redundant hardware items (like or unlike) all of which,
if failed, could cause loss of mission.
Redundancy Screen A:
1 = Is Checked Out PreFlight
2 = Is Capable of Check Out PreFlight
3 = Not Capable of Check Out PreFlight
NA = Not Applicable
Redundancy Screens B and C:
P = Passed Screen
F = Failed Screen
NA = Not Applicable
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22186
INSTRUMENTATION
I01
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DSC OF4, OM2, OL1/2, OR1/2
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) or
3) DSC
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: OF4-FWD RCS MODULE, OM2-MID FUSELAGE, OL1/2-LEFT
OMS POD, ORI/2-RIGHT OMS POD
PART NUMBER: MC476-0131
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF OR
IMPROPER INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDITIONS SIGNALS FROM VEHICLE SUBSYSTEM SENSORS AND PROVIDES
SENSOR EXCITATION SIGNALS, BUFFERING AND ISOLATION. NO MISSION
CRITICAL SIGNALS ARE PROCESSED BY 6 SUBJECT DSCs. LOSS OF DATA
DOES NOT EFFECT CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG. 17.1, INCO/COMM OI DSC BRIEF
SB48, SFOM INSTR VOL. 4E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
102
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DSC OF1, OF2, OF3
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) ol
3) DSC
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OF1-AV BAY l, OF2-AV BAY 2, OF3-AV BAY3
MC476-0131
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF OR
IMPROPER INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDITIONS SIGNALS FROM VEHICLE SUBSYSTEM SENSORS AND PROVIDES
SENSOR EXCITATION SIGNALS, BUFFERING AND ISOLATION. MISSION
CRITICAL ARPCS MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY THE 3 SUBJECT DSCs.
LOSS OF DATA DOES NOT AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT MISSION IF
ARPCS MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.
REFERENCES: SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17.1, INCO/COMM BRIEF SB48, SFOM
INSTR VOL. 4E
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-3
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
ii/22/S6
INSTRUMENTATION
103
DSC OF1, OF2, OF3
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3) DSC
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OF1-AV BAY l, OF2-AV BAY 2, OF3-AV BAY3
MC476-0131
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF OR
IMPROPER INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDITIONS SIGNALS FROM VEHICLE SUBSYSTEM SENSORS AND PROVIDES
SENSOR EXCITATION SIGNALS, BUFFERING AND ISOLATION. LOSS OF DATA
DOES NOT AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17.1, INCO/COMM BRIEF SB48, SFOM
INSTR VOL. 4E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
104
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DSC OA1, OA2, OA3, OM1
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/ R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3) DSC
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB IT: 3/ 1R AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/1R ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCAT ION:
FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
OA1-AV BAY 4, OA2-AV BAY 5, OA3-AV BAY 6, OM1-MID
MC476-0131
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF OR
IMPROPER INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDITIONS SIGNALS FROM VEHICLE SUBSYSTEM SENSORS AND PROVIDES
SENSOR EXCITATION SIGNALS, BUFFERING AND ISOLATION. CRITICAL APU
MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY THE 4 SUBJECT DSCs.
LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT CREW VEHICLE
IFSUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT
UNDETECTED.
REFERENCES: SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17.1, INCO/COMM BRIEF SB48, SFOM
INSTR VOL. 4E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11122/86
INSTRUMENTATION
105
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DSC OA1, OA2, OA3, OM1
LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) oi
3) DSC
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/ 3 RT LS : 3/ 3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/1R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LO CAT I ON:
FUSELAGE
PART NUMBER:
OA1-AV BAY 4, OA2-AV BAY 5, OA3-AV BAY 6, OM1-MID
MC476-0131
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF OR
IMPROPER INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDITIONS SIGNALS FROM VEHICLE SUBSYSTEM SENSORS AND PROVIDES
SENSOR EXCITATION SIGNALS, BUFFERING AND ISOLATION. CRITICAL APU
MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY THE 4 SUBJECT DSCs.
LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE
IF SUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT
UNDETECTED.
REFERENCES: SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17.1, INCO/COMM BRIEF SB48, SFOM
INSTR VOL. 4E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
DSC 0F4, OM2, OLI/2, OR1/2
LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) ol
3) DSC
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: OF4-FWD RCS MODULE, OM2-MID FUSELAGE, OL1/2-LEFT
OMS POD, ORI/2-RIGHT OMS POD
PART NUMBER: MC476-0131
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF OR
IMPROPER INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONDITIONS SIGNALS FROM VEHICLE SUBSYSTEM SENSORS, PROVIDES
SENSOR EXCITATION SIGNALS, BUFFERING AND ISOLATION. NO MISSION
CRITICAL SIGNALS ARE PROCESSED BY 6 SUBJECT DSCs. LOSS OF DATA
DOES NOT AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
i12
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: MDM OF1, OF2
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) ol
3) MDM
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ]
LOCATION: OF1 AV BAY l, OF2 AV BAY 2
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-54,-6410
c[P]
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF OR
IMPROPER INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INSTRUMENTATION MDMs RECEIVE ANALOG, DISCRETE OR SERIAL DIGITAL
INFORMATION FROM SUBSYSTEMS AND CONVERT AND FORMAT DATA FOR
TRANSMISSION TO THE PCMMU. CRITICAL ARPCS MEASUREMENTS ARE
PROCESSED BY THE 3 SUBJECT MDMs.
LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT MISSION IF
SUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.
REFERENCES: SSSH OI/DSC/MDM DWG. 17.1, INCO/COMM MDM BRIEF SB28,
SFOM INSTR VOL. 4E
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INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
ll3
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/IR
3/IR
ITEM: MDM OF4, OA1, OA2, OA3
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) oi
3) MDM
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: OF4-FLIGHT DECK, OAI-AV BAY 4, OA2-AV BAY 5, OA3-AV
BAY 6
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-5400,-6410
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF OR
IMPROPER INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INSTRUMENTATION MDMs RECEIVE ANALOG, DISCRETE, OR SERIAL DIGITAL
INFORMATION FROM SUBSYSTEMS AND CONVERT AND FORMAT DATA FOR
TRANSMISSION TO THE PCMMU. CRITICAL APU MEASUREMENTS ARE
PROCESSED BY THE 4 SUBJECT MDMs.
LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE
IF SUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT WAS LOST.
REFERENCES: SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG. 17.1, INCO/COMM BRIEF SB28,
SFOM INSTR. VOL. 4E
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-9
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
Ii/22/S6
INSTRUMENTATION
114
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: MDM OF3
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3) MDM
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION: AV BAY 3
PART NUMBER: MC615-0004-5400,-6400
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF OR
IMPROPER INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INSTRUMENTATION MDMs RECEIVE ANALOG, DISCRETE OR SERIAL DIGITAL
INFORMATION FROM SUBSYSTEMS AND CONVERT AND FORMAT DATA FOR
TRANSMISSION TO THE PCMMU. CRITICAL ARPCS MEASUREMENTS ARE
PROCESSED BY SUBJECT MDM.
LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE DOES NOT AFFECT
CREW/VEHICLE BUT COULD AFFECT MISSION IF SUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT
WAS LOST.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-10
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/18/86
INSTRUMENTATION
ll5
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/1R
2/IR
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MDM OA1, OA2, OA3
LOSS OF OUTPUT, OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) ol
3) MDM
4)
s)
6)
7)
s)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRE LAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 2/IR
LIFTOFF: 2/1R TAL: 2/IR
ONORB I T: 2/ 1R AOA: 2 / IR
DEORBIT: 2/IR ATO: 2/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 2/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
OA1 - AVBAY 4 OA2 - AVBAY 5 OA3 - AV BAY 6
MC615-0004-5400
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, LOSS OF OR
IMPROPER INPUT, MECHANICAL SHOCK, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE MDMs HANDLE CRITICAL FUEL CELL/ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION
MEASUREMENTS. HEATER ELEMENT FAILED ON COULD CAUSE CATASTROPHIC
FUEL CELL FAILURE. LOSS OF THE CRITICAL MEASUREMENTS INDICATING
SUCH CONDITION COULD BE CRITICAL. REFERENCE EPD&C/EPG 2207.
REFERENCES: SSSH OI DSC/MDM DWG 17.1, INCO/COMM OI DSC BRIEF
SB48, SFOM VOL 4E
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-11
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
121
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PULSE CODE MODULATION MASTER UNIT (PCMMU)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PULSE CODE MODULATION MASTER UNIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAYS l, 2
MC476-0130
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PCMMUACCEPTS GPC DOWNLIST DATA, OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
DATA, AND PAYLOAD DATA. IT ASSEMBLES AND FORMATS THE DATA AND
ROUTES IT TO THE COMM SYSTEM FOR TELEMETRY TO GROUND, EITHER
REAL-TIME OR PLAYBACK.
LOSS OF OUTPUT FOR FIRST LRU WOULD INVOKE PRIORITY FLIGHT BECAUSE
NEXT PCMMU FAILURE WOULD MEAN LOSS OF ALL DATA. REDUNDANT UNIT
WOULD BE ACTIVATED AND FORMAT INSTRUCTIONS LOADED. LOSS OF
SECOND UNIT WOULD REQUIRE RETURN TO NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-974099, SSSH 17.2, INCO/COMM SYS
BRIEF 22, OMRSD, PCMMU SPECIFICATION MC476-0130
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-12
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
122
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PULSE CODE MODULATION MASTER UNIT (PCMMU)
ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
5)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PULSE CODE MODULATION MASTER UNIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAYS l, 2
MC476-0130
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PCMMU ACCEPTS GPC DOWNLIST DATA, OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
DATA, AND PAYLOAD DATA. IT ASSEMBLES AND FORMATS THE DATA AND
ROUTES IT TO THE COMM SYSTEM FOR TELEMETRY TO GROUND, EITHER
REAL-TIME OR PLAYBACK. ERRATIC OPERATION OF THE FIRST LRU
WOULD INVOKE PRIORITY FLIGHT BECAUSE NEXT PCMMU FAILURE WOULD
MEAN LOSS OF ALL DATA. REDUNDANT UNIT WOULD BE ACTIVATED AND
FORMAT INSTRUCTIONS LOADED. LOSS OF SECOND UNIT WOULD REQUIRE
RETURN TO NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-974099, SSSH 17.2, INCO/COMM SYS
BRIEF 22, OMRSD, PCMMU SPECIFICATION MC476-0130
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i1/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
123
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PULSE CODE MODULATION MASTER UNIT (PCMMU)
INTERMITTENT OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PULSE CODE MODULATION MASTER UNIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[NA] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AVIONICS BAYS l, 2
MC476-0130
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, _PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PCMMU ACCEPTS GPC DOWNLIST DATA, OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
DATA, AND PAYLOAD DATA. IT ASSEMBLES AND FORMATS THE DATAAND
ROUTES IT TO THE COMM SYSTEM FOR TELEMETRY TO GROUND, EITHER
REAL-TIME OR PLAYBACK. INTERMITTENT OPERATION OF THE ACTIVE
LRU WOULD INVOKE PRIORITY FLIGHT BECAUSE NEXT PCMMU FAILURE WOULD
MEAN LOSS OF ALL DATA. REDUNDANT UNIT WOULD BE ACTIVATED AND
FORMAT INSTRUCTIONS LOADED. LOSS OF SECOND UNITWOULD REQUIRE
RETURN TO NEXT PRIMARY LANDING SITE.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-974099, SSSH 17.2, INCO/COMM SYS
BRIEF 22, OMRSD, PCMMU SPECIFICATION MC476-0130
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-14
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
124
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PCMMU FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PCMMU
FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL C3
ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH PERMITS MANUAL SELECTION OF THREE
CLASSES OF DONWLINK DATA FORMATTING BY THE PCMMU: FIXED, GPC,
AND PROGRAM. EFFECTS OF ITS BEING BLOCKED IN EACH OF THESE
POSITIONS ARE:
FIXED - USED FOR LAUNCH AND LANDING, AND DURING TIME NEW FORMAT
IS BEING LOADED. BINDING IN FIXED DURING ON-ORBIT WOULD RESULT
IN LOSS OF PAYLOAD AND SM2 SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT.
GPC - NO FIXED FORMAT AVAILABLE. PROGRAM - LOCKED IN PCMMUAND
PDI TELEMETRY FORMATS WHEN FAILURE OCCURRED. CANNOT CHANGE PCMMU
TFL OR PDI DFL. WORST-CASE EFFECT WOULD BE LOSS OF MISSION
BECAUSE OF INABILITY TO LOAD APPROPRIATE TFLs.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-974099, SSSH 17.2, INCO/COMM SYS
BRIEF, OMRSD, PCMMU SPECIFICATION MC476-0130
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-15
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
Ii/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
125
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PCMMU FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH
SHORTED
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PCMMU
FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL C3
ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: PIECE-PARTSTRUCTUP_LFAILURE, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH PERMITS MANUAL SELECTION OF THREE
CLASSES OF DOWNLINK DATA FORMATTING BY THE PCMMU: FIXED, GPC,
AND PROGRAM. INABILITY TO LOAD APPROPRIATE TFLs WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-974099, SSSH 17.2, INCO/COMM SYS
BRIEF, OMRSD, PCMMU SPECIFICATION MC476-0130
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-16
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
126
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PCMMU FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH
OPEN
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A° W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PCMMU
FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL C3
ME452-0102-7203
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE FORMAT CONTROL SWITCH PERMITS MANUAL SELECTION OF THREE
CLASSES OF DOWNLINK DATA FORMATTING BY THE PCMMU: FIXED, GPC,
PROGRAM. INABILITY TO LOAD APPROPRIATE TFLs WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-974099, SSSH 17.2, INCO/COMM SYS
BRIEF, OMRSD, PCMMU SPECIFICATION MC476-0130
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-17
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
131
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MASTER TIMING UNIT (MTU)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
MASTER TIMING UNIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL:
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD AVIONICS BAY 3B
MC456-0051-0005
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: TEM:PERATURE, V_BRATION, MISHANDLING, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CORROSION/CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MTU PROVIDES TIME TO MANY ORBITER SYSTEMS/LRU'S, INCLUDING
THE GPC'S AND ACTIVE PCMMU. SOME MTU SUBASSEMBLIES ARE DUAL,
OTHERS TRIPLY REDUNDANT, BUT THERE ARE SOME SPF'S THAT CAN CAUSE
LOSS OF OUTPUT WHICH WOULD NOT BE SENSED TO CAUSE SWITCHOVER.
ON LOSS OF MTU TIMING, THE REDUNDANT-SET GPC'S AND ACTIVE PCMMU
WOULD DEFAULT TO THEIR INTERNAL CLOCKS. LOSS OF MTU OUTPUT WOULD
NOT AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE BUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION, BECAUSE
MTU TIME IS USED BY ORBITER FOR AUTHENTICATION
OF ENCRYPTED COMMANDS.
REFERENCES:
4.0, OMRSD
SCHEMATIC VS70-974099, SSSH 8.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
132
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MASTER TIMING UNIT (MTU)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
MASTER TIMING UNIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FWD AVIONICS BAY 3B
PART NUMBER: MC456-0051-0005
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, OVERVOLTAGE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MTU PROVIDES TIME TO MANY ORIBITER SYSTEMS/LRU'S, INCLUDING
GPC'S AND ACTIVE PCMMU. SOME MTUSUBASSEMBLIESARE DUAL, OTHERS
TRIPLY REDUNDANT, BUT THERE ARE SOME SPF'S THAT COULD CAUSE
FREQUENCY SHIFTS AND ERRONEOUS TIME OUTPUTS.
ON LOSS OF MTU TIMING, THE ACTIVE PCMMUAND THE REDUNDANT-SET
GPC'S WOULD DEFAULT TO THEIR INTERNAL CLOCKS. ERRONEOUS MTU
OUTPUT WOULD NOT AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE BUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF
MISSION, BECAUSE MTUTIME IS USED BY ORBITER FOR AUTHENTICATION
OF ENCRYPTED COMMANDS.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-974099, SSSH 8.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF
4.0, OMRSD
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii122/86
INSTRUMENTATION
133
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: MASTER TIMING UNIT (MTU)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
MASTER TIMING UNIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A[ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC456-0051-0005
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE MTU PROVIDES TIME TO MANY ORBITER SYSTEMS/LRU'S INCLUDING THE
ACTIVE PCMMU AND THE GPC'S. SOME MTU SUBASSEMBLIES ARE DUAL,
OTHERS TRIPLY REDUNDANT, BUT THERE ARE SOME SPF'S THAT COULD
CAUSE OSCILLATOR FREQUENCY SHIFTS AND ERRATIC TIME OUTPUTS.
ON LOSS OF MTU TIMING, THE REDUNDANT SET GPC'S AND ACTIVE PCMMU
WOULD DEFAULT TO THEIR INTERNAL CLOCKS. ERRATIC MTU OPERATION
WOULD NOT AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE BUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION,
BECAUSE MTU TIME IS USED BY ORBITER FOR AUTHENTICATION
OF ENCRYPTED COMMANDS.
REFERENCES:
4.0, OMRSD
SCHEMATIC VS70-974099, SSSH 8.9, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-20
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
141
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER (PTB)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FLT DK, BEHIND PNL LI6
PART NUMBER: MC456-0060-0001, 0002
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PTB RECEIVES IRIG B GMT AND IRIG B MET SIGNALS FROM MTUAND
PROVIDES DEDICATED TIMING SIGNALS TO PAYLOADS. LOSS OF TIMING
FROM PTB WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
IF PTB FAILS, IFM PROCEDURE CAN BE USED TO SWAP PTB AND OTB
OUTPUTS TO PROVIDE TIMING SIGNAL TO PAYLOADS.
REFERENCES: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, INCO/COMM SYSTEMS
BRIEF, OMRSD
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
142
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER (PTB)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AFT FLT DK, BEHIND PNL L16
PART NUMBER: MC456-0060-0001, 0002
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, TEMPERATURE, PARTIAL INPUT, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PTB RECEIVES IRIG B GMT AND IRIG B MET SIGNALS FROM MTU AND
PROVIDES DEDICATED TIMING SIGNALS TO PAYLOADS. LOSS OF TIMING
FROM PTB WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
IF PTB FAILS IFM PROCEDURE CAN BE USED TO SWAP OTB AND PTB
OUTPUTS TO PROVIDE TIMING SIGNAL TO PAYLOADS.
REFERENCES:
BRIEF, OMRSD
SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, INCO/COMM SYSTEMS
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/22/86
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 143
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER (PTB)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PAYLOAD TIMING BUFFER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FLT DK, BEHIND PNL L16
PART NUMBER: MC456-0060-0001, 0002
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, TEMPERATURE, MISHANDLING, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PTB RECEIVES IRIG B GMT AND IRIB B MET SIGNALS FROM MTU AND
PROVIDES DEDICATED TIMING SIGNALS TO PAYLOADS. LOSS OF TIMING
FROM PTB WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
IF PTB FAILS, IFM PROCEDURE CAN BE USED TO SWAP OTB AND PTB
OUTPUTS TO PROVIDE TIMING TO PAYLOADS.
REFERENCES: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, INCO/COMM SYSTEMS
BRIEF, OMRSD
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i1/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
151
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
ORBITER TIMING BUFFER (OTB)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
ORBITER TIMING BUFFER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: AFT FLT DK, BEHIND PNL L16
PART NUMBER: MC456-0060-001
CAUSES: LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
TEMPERATURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OTB RECEIVES IRIG B GMT AND IRIG B MET SIGNALS FROM MTU AND
PROVIDES TIMING SIGNALS TO ORBITER AFT MISSION TIMER, MADS, CCTV,
ACIP (AERODYNAMIC COEFFICIENT INSTRUMENTATION PACKAGE), AND
SEPARATION CAMERAS.
LOSS OF TIMING FROM OTB WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR
TO MISSION. IFM PROCEDURE MAY BE USED TO SWAP OTB AND PTB
OUTPUTS.
REFERENCES: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, INCO/COMM SYSTEMS
BRIEF, OMRSD
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/22/86
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION
MDAC ID: 152
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: ORBITER TIMING BUFFER (OTB)
FAILURE MODE: ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
ORBITER TIMING BUFFER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B[ ] C[ ]
AFT FLT DK, BEHIND PNL L16
MC456-0060-001
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, TEMPERATURE, PARTIAL INPUT, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OTB RECEIVES IRIG B GMT AND IRIG B MET SIGNALS FROM MTU AND
PROVIDES TIMING SIGNALS TO ORBITER AFT MISSION TIMER, MADS, CCTV,
ACIP, AND SEPARATION CAMERAS.
LOSS OF TIMING FROM OTB WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR
TO MISSION. IFM PROCEDURE MAY BE USED TO SWAP OTB AND PTB
OUTPUTS.
REFERENCES: SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, INCO/COMM SYSTEMS
BRIEF, OMRSD
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
153
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: ORBITER TIMING BUFFER (OTB)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
ORBITER TIMING BUFFER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
B [ ] C [ ]
AFT FLT DK, BEHIND PNL L16
MC456-0060-001
CAUSES: ERRONEOUS INPUT, TEMPERATURE, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE, VIBRATION, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
OTB RECEIVES IRIG B GMT AND IRIG B MET SIGNALS FROM MTU AND
PROVIDES TIMING SIGNALS TO ORBITER AFT MISSION TIMER, MADS, CCTV,
ACIP AND SEPARATION CAMERAS.
LOSS OF TIMING FROM OTB WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR
TO MISSION. IFM PROCEDURE MAY BE USED TO SWAP OTB AND PTB
OUTPUTS.
REFERENCES:
BRIEF, OMRSD
SPACE SHUTTLE SYSTEMS HANDBOOK, INCO/COMM SYSTEMS
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
161
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER (PDI)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD AVIONICS BAY 1
PART NUMBER: MC476-0136
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, LOSS OF INPUT, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PDI ASSEMBLES AND MULTIPLEXES SIMULTANEOUS DATA FROM MULTIPLE
PAYLOADS AND ROUTES A COMBINED DATA BIT STREAM TO THE PCMMU FOR
DOWNNLINK. FOR SOME MISSIONS A SPARE PDI IS REQUIRED TO BE
CARRIED AS A REPLACEMENT.
LOSS OF PDI OUTPUT WOULD BE MISSION CRITICAL FOR PAYLOADS
REQUIRING PRE-DEPLOY CHECKOUT TELEMETRY DATA.
REFERENCES: INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, SSSH 17.3, SCHEMATIC VS70-
974099, OMRSD
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i1/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
162
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER (PDI)
FAILURE MODE: ERRATIC OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [NA ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD AVIONICS BAY 1
PART NUMBER: MC476-0136
CAUSES: VIBRATION, _PARTIAL INPUT, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
MISHANDLING, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PDI ASSEMBLES AND MULTIPLEXES SIMULTANEOUS DATA FROM MULTIPLE
PAYLOADS AND ROUTES A COMBINED DATA STREAM TO THE PCMMU FOR
DOWNLINK. FOR SOME MISSIONS A SPARE PDI IS REQUIRED TO BE
CARRIED AS A SPARE.
ERRATIC PDI OPERATION WOULD BE MISSION CRITICAL FOR PAYLOADS
REQUIRING PRE-DEPLOY CHECKOUT TELEMETRY.
REFERENCES: INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, SSSH 17.3, SCHEMATIC VS70-
974099, OMRSD
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
163
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER (PDI)
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
312R
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
v)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OPERATIONAL INSTRUMENTATION
PAYLOAD DATA INTERLEAVER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD AVIONICS BAY 1
MC476-0136
B [NA ] C [ P ]
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, PARTIAL INPUT, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PDI ASSEMBLES AND MULTIPLEXES SIMULTANEOUS DATA FROM MULTIPLE
PAYLOADS AND ROUTES A COMBINED BIT STREAM TO THE PCMMU FOR
DOWNLINK. FOR SOME MISSIONS A SPARE PDI IS REQUIRED TO BE
CARRIED AS A REPLACEMENT.
ERRONEOUS OUTPUT WOULD BE MISSION CRITICAL FOR PAYLOADS REQUIRING
PRE-DEPLOY CHECKOUT TELEMETRY.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC V72-978099, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, SSSH
17.3, OMRSD
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-29
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3
MDAC ID: 171 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SHUTTLE TAPE RECORDER OPS l&2
FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO
SWITCH, FAILS TO START/STOP, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, ERRATIC
OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
SHUTTLE TAPE RECORDER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P ]
LOCATION: FWD. AVIONICS BAY 2
PART NUMBER: 4411900"2,'3
CAUSES: LOSS OF OR IMPROPER INPUT, TEMPERATURE (HIGH),
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE OPS 1 & 2 STR RECORD/PLAY BACK DIGITAL AND/OR ANALOG
OPERATIONAL DATA AND VOICE. EIU DATA IS RECORDED ON OPS 1 ONLY.
UNITS ARE USED ALTERNATELY; ONE RECORDS WHILE THE OTHER DUMPS PCM
DATA TO THE GROUND.
LOSS OF ONE OR BOTH STRS WILL NOT AFFECT CREW VEHICLE MISSION.
REFERENCES :
VOL. 4E
SSSH DWG. 16.18; INCO/COMM BRF 13.0: SFOM INSTR
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-30
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3
172 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
OPS 2 STRS
FAILURE MODE:
OPEN
SWITCH MODE RECORD/STANDBY/PLAYBACK FOR OPS 1 &
INADVERTENT OPERATION, LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORTED,
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) oi
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
OPS RCDR MODE CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FLT STATION, PNL AIR
36V73AIA3S5/6
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
IN "PANEL" CONTROL MODE FOR OPS 1 AND 2 RECORDERS, MODE SWITCHES
PROVIDE SIGNALS TO INITIATE PLAYBACK AND RECORDING OF DATA;
"STANDBY" MODE CANCELS DIRECT COMMANDS AND STOPS TAPE MOTION.
THESE FUNCTIONS ARE NORMALLY UNDER GROUND CONTROL
AND CAN BE COMMANDED BY THE KEYBOARD. CRITICALITY IS 3; LOSS OF
FUNCTION WILL NOT AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES:
VOL. 4E
SSSH DWG. 16.18; INCO/COMM BRF 13.0: SFOM INSTR
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-31
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: /
173 ABORT: /
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH MODE, OPS 1 & 2 ANOMALY START/OFF/ERASE
NOT CONSIDERED
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OI
PANEL AIR
SWITCH OPS 1/2 STR ANOMALY SEQ.
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: SWITCH, TOGGLE 36V73AIA3S7
CAUSES: NOT CONSIDERED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
INTENDED TO PROVIDE FOR PANEL SELECTION OF ANOMALY
START/OFF/ERASE FUNCTIONS FOR OPS 1 & 2 STRS. THE SWITCH HAS NO
FUNCTION AS IT RECEIVES POWER FROM THE LOOP/MAINT SWITCH, WHICH
IS NOT USED.
REFERENCES: SSSH DWG. NO. 16.18, INCO/COMM SYST BRIEF SB 13.0;
SFOM-INSTR VOL. 4E, COMM/INSTR WORKBOOK COM/IN 2102.
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-32
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: /
MDAC ID: 174 ABORT: /
ITEM: SWITCH, MODE LOOP/MAINT OPS 1 & 2 STRS
FAILURE MODE: NOT CONSIDERED
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OI
OPS RCDR LOOP/MAINT MODE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: / RTLS: /
LIFTOFF: / TAL: /
ONORBIT: / AOA: /
DEORBIT: / ATO: /
LANDING/SAFING: /
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
AFT FLT STATION, PNL AIR
SWITCH ROTARY 36V73AIA3S8
CAUSES: NOT CONSIDERED
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES FOR PANEL SELECTION OF LOOP/MAINT/MANUAL RECORDING
FUNCTIONS FOR OI STR. THERE IS NO PLAN TO USE INDICATED MODES OF
OPERATION. SOFTWARE WAS NEVER DEVELOPED TO IMPLEMENT SWITCH
FUNCTIONS. SWITCH IS ALWAYS IN MANUAL POSITION.
REFERENCES: SSSH DWG. NO. 16.18: INCO/COMM SYSTEM BRIEF SB 13.0:
SFOM INSTR. VOL 4E, COMM/INSTR WORKBOOK COM/IN2102.
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-33
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 181 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SHUTTLE TAPE RECORDER-PAYLOAD
FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES: LOSS OF OUTPUT, FAILS TO
SWITCH, FAILS TO START/STOP, PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, ERRATIC
OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3) PAYLOAD RCDR
4)
5)
6)
7)
B)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FWD. AVIONICS BAY 1
4411700-1,-2
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: LOSS OF OR IMPROPER INPUT, TEMPERATURE (HIGH),
VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THE PL STR RECORDS DIGITAL OR ANALOG PL DATA, SERIAL OR PARALLEL.
EITHER OPS STR CAN BE SUBSTITUTED FOR PL STR BY IFM PROCEDURE.
DIGITAL PL DATA CANBE PLAYED BACK AND DOWNLINKED VIA S-BAND FM
OF KU-BAND COMM, BUT ANALOG DATA CANNOT.
LOSS OF PL STR RECORD/PLAYBACK CAPABILITY WOULD NOT AFFECT
CREW/VEHICLE, BUT COULD CAUSE MISSION LOSS FOR SOME MISSIONS.
REFERENCES: SSSH-DWG. NO. 16.19; INCO/COMM SYST. BRIEF SB13.0;
SFOM - INSTR VOL 4E
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-34
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
182
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHORTED
SWITCH, ROTARY P/L STR MODE SELECT
ALL CREDIBLE MODES ® FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN,
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
OI
PANEL AIR
SWITCH, P/L RCDR MODE SELECT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
36V73AIA3S10
CAUSES:
OUTPUT
CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, LOSS OF
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES P/L STR MODE SELECT FUNCTIONS; RECORD, PLAYBACK ,
FWD/REV SERIAL/PARALLEL AND ERASE, NO AFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE.
LOSS OF GROUND, KEYBOARD AND PANEL CONTROL OF P/L STR COULD CAUSE
LOSS OF SOME MISSIONS.
REFERENCES: SSSH-DWGo NO. 16.19; INCO/COMM SYST BRF SB 13.0
SFOM-INSTRU VOL. 4E
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-35
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE: 11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
SUBSYSTEM: INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/2R
MDAC ID: 183 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM: SWITCH, OPERATE/ERASE-PAYLOAD STR
FAILURE MODE: ALL CREDIBLE MODES: INTERMITTENT OPERATION, LOSS
OF OUTPUT, SHORTED, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) OI
3) PANEL AIR
4) SWITCH, OPERATE/ERASE
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: FLIGHT STATION
PART NUMBER: 36V73AIA3S9
B [ P] C [ P ]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, ABUSE, TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION,
INADVERTANT OPERATION, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES PANEL CONTROL OF OPERATE/ERASE SELECTION FOR THE PAYLOAD
STR. NO AFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE. LOSS OF GROUND, KEYBOARD AND
PANEL CONTROL OF THE PAYLOAD STR COULD CAUSE LOSS OF SOME
MISSIONS.
REFERENCES: SSSH-DWG. NO 16.19; INCO/COMM SYST BRF. SB 13.00;
SFOM-INSTR VOL. 4E
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-36
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
184
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SHORTED
SWITCH, ROTARY P/L STR SPEED CONTROL
ALL CREDIBLE MODES: FAILS TO SWITCH, OPEN,
LEAD ANALYST: B. HOWARD SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) oi
3) PANEL AIR
4) SWITCH, STR SPEED
5)
6)
v)
8)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
FLIGHT STATION
36V73AIA3S14
CAUSES:
INPUT
CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE (HIGH), VIBRATION, LOSS OF
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES PANEL CONTROL FOR SELECTION OF P/L RCDR SPEEDS
DETERMINED BY THE PROGRAM PLUG. NO AFFECT ON CREW/VEHICLE. LOSS
OF GROUND, KEYBOARD AND PANEL CONTROL COULD CAUSE LOSS OF SOME
MISSIONS.
REFERENCES: SSSH-DWG NO 16.19, INCO/COMM SYST. BRIEF SB13.0;
SFOM-INSTR VOL. 4E
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-37
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii/22/s6
INSTRUMENTATION
201
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WIDE-BAND SIGNAL CONDITIONER (WBSC)
LOSS OF OUTPUT, INTERMITTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
WIDE-BAND SIGNAL CONDITIONER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY, SHELF 8
MC476-0132
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE% LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
WBSCs CONDITION INPUTS FROM PIEZO-ELECTRIC TRANSDUCERS TO MAKE
MEASUREMENT DATA WITH WIDE DYNAMIC RANGE (E.G., VIBRATORY,
ACOUSTICAL, POGO) COMPATIBLE WITH THE FREQUENCY-DIVISION
MULTIPLEXER(S). LOSS OF OUTPUT WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, SCHEMATIC
VS72-978099
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-38
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11122/86
INSTRUMENTATION
211
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
WIDE BAND ACIP PCM SWITCH
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
WIDE BAND ACIP PCM
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7L
36V73A7A255
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTROLS WIDEBAND DATA MODE, PROVIDES POWER TO FDM'S AND ACIP PCM
EQUIPMENT VIA MCM OR VIA SWITCH.
EFFECTS OF JAMMING: CMD: WIDEBAND EQUIPMENT MODE AND POWER
CONTROLLED ONLY BY COMMAND VIA MDM PFI; OFF: REMOVES POWER; ON:
WIDEBAND EQUIPMENT MODE AND POWER CONTROLLED ONLY BY SWITCH (NO
CMD CAPABILITY). LOSS OF FUNCTION WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, SCHEMATIC VS72-978099
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-39
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii/22/s6
INSTRUMENTATION
212
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
STRAIN GAGE SIGNAL CONDITIONERS (SGSC'S)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
STRAIN GAGE SIGNAL CONDITIONERS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY, SHELF 8
PART NUMBER: MC476-0134
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SGSCs CONDITION INPUTS FROM INDIVIDUAL STRAIN GAGE TRANSDUCERS
SENSING STRUCTURAL STRESSES. SGSC OUTPUTS ARE ROUTED TO THE MADS
PCM MUX. LOSS OF OUTPUT WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR
TO MISSION.
REFERENCES:
V72-978099
INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, SCHEMATIC
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-40
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/s6
INSTRUMENTATION
213
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: MADS STRAIN GAGE CONTROL SWITCH
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
3) STRAIN GAGE CONTROL SWITCH
4)
S)
6)
7)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7L
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
STRAIN GAGE SWITCH CONTROLS POWER TO MADS STRAIN GAGE EQUIPMENT°
BINDING IN THE THREE POSITIONS WOULD HAVE FOLLOWING EFFECTS:
PCM ENA: STRAIN GAGE POWER CAN BE APPLIED VIA MCM ONLY; OFF: NO
POWER TO STRAIN GAGE EQUIPMENT; ON: STRAIN GAGE POWER CAN ONLY BE
APPLIED VIA SWITCH. LOSS OF CONTROL OF STRAIN GAGE POWER WOULD
NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS72-978099, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-41
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
218
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: FASCOS
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT, OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
FLIGHT ACCELERATION SAFETY CUTOFF SYSTEM (FASCOS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: AT MAIN ENGINES
PART NUMBER: 477-1469-001
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE,
CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
FASCOS IS A SIGNAL CONDITIONER PACKAGE THAT HANDLES MAIN ENGINE
ACCELEROMETER DATA AND FORWARDS IT TO MADS FOR RECORDING.
FASCOS DATA IS NOT DOWNLINKED REAL-TIME TO GROUND OR RECORDED ON
OI OPS RECORDERS. LOSS OF MADS FASCOS DATA WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL
TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION. NOTE: THE "CO" IN FASCOS IS NOW A
MISNOMER; THE ENGINE CUTOFF FUNCTION HAS BEEN DISABLED.
REFERENCES: MAIN ENGINE ICD 13M 15000, VS72-941102
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-42
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/s6
INSTRUMENTATION
221
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FREQUENCY DIVISION MULTIPLEXER
LOSS OF OUTPUT , SHORT, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM (MADS)
FREQUENCY DIVISION MULTIPLEXER (FDM)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: MIDBODY, SHELF 8
PART NUMBER: MC409-0010
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
EACH FDM HAS 15 CHANNELS. EACH CHANNEL HAS A VOLTAGE-CONTROLLED
OSCILLATOR (VCO) MODULATED BY AN ANALOG SIGNAL REPRESENTING A
MEASUREMENT. INDIVIDUAL VCO OUTPUTS ARE SUMMED INTO A COMPOSITE
MULTIPLEXER OUTPUT THAT IS ROUTED TO MADS RECORDER
OR TO T-O UMBILICAL. LOSS OF OUTPUT WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES:
V72-978099
INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, SCHEMATIC
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-43
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSlS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
zz122/8.6
INSTRUMENTATION
222
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FDM CALIBRATION CONTROL
LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
9)
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
FDM CALIBRATION CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORB I T: 3/ 3 AOA: 3/ 3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A7L
PART NUMBER: V408-780209
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CALIBRATE FUNCTION IS DONE PERIODICALLY TO ESTABLISH POINTS TO
OBTAIN A CALIBRATION CURVE FOR EACH FDM VCO. AUTOMATIC FDM
CALIBRATE CAN BE DONE VIA UPLINK COMMAND OR BY MANUALLY SELECTING
THE "AUTO CALIBRATE" POSITION ON FDM CONTROL SWITCH ON PANEL ATL.
MANUAL CALIBRATE CAN BE DONE BY PUTTING FDM CONTROL SWITCH IN
"MANUAL" FOR EACH SELECTED CALIBRATION LEVEL ON THE "MAN CALIBR"
ROTARY SWITCH ON PANEL A7L. LOSS OF CALIBRATION FUNCTION WOULD
NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, SCHEMATIC
VS72-978099
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-44
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
231
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: PCM MUX
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, INTERMITTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM (MADS)
PULSE CODE MODULATION MULTIPLEXER (PCM MUX)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
MIDBODY, SHELF 8
MC476-0251
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, LOSS OF INPUT, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PCM MUX CONDITIONS, DIGITIZES, MULTIPLEXES DISCRETES, HIGH AND
LOW LEVEL ANALOG SIGNALS, AND BRIDGE COMPLETION DATA, AND FORMATS
DATA FOR 32 KBPS OR 64 KBPS BIT STREAM TO MADS RECORDER OR TO T-O
UMBILICAL. LOSS OF OUTPUT WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL
TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES:
V72-978099
INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, SCHEMATIC
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-45
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
232
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: PCM MODE CONTROLSWITCH
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, SHORT, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
S)
MADS
PCM MODE CONTROL SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANELATL
36V73A7A256
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURALFAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PERMITS PCM EQUIPMENT TO BE CONTROLLED BY COMMAND OR MANUALLY.
LOSS OF FUNCTION WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO
MISSION.
REFERENCES: INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, SCHEMATIC VS72-978099
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-46
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
12/22/s6
INSTRUMENTATION
233
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PCM RECORD MODE SWITCH
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING, SHORT, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MADS
PCM RECORD MODE SWITCH
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS : 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL ATL
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PERMITS MANUAL SELECTION OF SAMPLE OR CONTINUOUS RECORD MODE. IN
SAMPLE MODE PCM DATA IS SAMPLED FOR l0 SECONDS EACH i0 MINUTES;
IN CONTINUOUS MODE DATA IS RECORDED CONTINUOUSLY. LOSS OF
FUNCTION WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: INCO/COMMM SYS BRIEF, SCHEMATIC VS72-978099
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-47
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
241
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MADS CONTROL MODULE (MCM)
LOSS OF OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM (MADS)
MADS CONTROL MODULE (MCM)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION: CABIN MIDDECK
PART NUMBER: V408-763220
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MCM SUPPLIES POWER TO RECORDER, FDM'S, PCM, STRAIN GAGES, AND
SIGNAL CONDITIONERS. ALSO CONTROLS RECORDER SPEEDS, MODES,
DIRECTION OF TAPE MOTION, TRACK SELECTION, AND PCM FORMAT/RATE.
LOSS OF OUTPUT COULD DISABLE ALL OR PART OF MADS.
THE SYSTEM IS NOT CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES:
V72-978099
INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, SCHEMATIC
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-48
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
251
ITEM: MADS RECORDER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO START/STOP
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
MADS RECORDER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN MIDDECK
ME435-0053
CAUSES: LOSS OF CONTROL INPUT, MISHANDLING, VIBRATION, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MADS RECORDER RECORDS SELECTED PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, STRAIN,
VIBRATION, EVENT DATA FROM MADS PCM MUX AND FDM, AND ALSO FROM
SRB'S AND ET. FAILURE TO START/STOP WOULD CAUSE PARTIAL OR
COMPLETE LOSS OF DATA. LOSS OF MADS DATA WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL
TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES:
V72-978099
INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, SCHEMATIC
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-49
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
252
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MADS RECORDER
PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
MADS RECORDER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN MIDDECK
ME435-0053
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MIS_DLING, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MADS RECORDER RECORDS SELECTED PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, STRAIN,
VIBRATION, EVENT DATA. BINDING/JAMMING WOULD CAUSE PARTIAL OR
COMPLETE LOSS OF DATA.
LOSS OF MADS DATA WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO
MISSION.
REFERENCES:
V72-978099
INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, SCHEMATIC
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-50
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
253
ITEM: MADS RECORDER
FAILURE MODE: FAILS TO SWITCH
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
9)
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
MADS RECORDER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
CABIN MIDDECK
ME435-0053
CAUSES: LOSS OF CONTROL INPUT, MISHANDLING, VIBRATION, PIECE-
PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MADS RECORDER RECORDS SELECTED PRESSURE, TEMPERATURE, STRAIN,
VIBRATION, EVENT DATA FROM MADS PCM MUXAND FDM, AND ALSO FROM
SRB'S AND ET. FAILURE TO SWITCH TRACKS OR DIRECTION OF TAPE
MOTION WOULD CAUSE PARTIAL LOSS OF DATA. LOSS OF MADS DATA
WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES:
V72-978099
INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, SCHEMATIC
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-51
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i1/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
254
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
MADS RECORDER FORMAT CONTROL
LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
RECORDER FORMAT CONTROL
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] BC ] C[ ]
LOCATION: PANEL A7L
PART NUMBER: V408-780209
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING, VIBRATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RECORDER FORMAT CONTROLS PERMIT SELECTION OF RECORDER TAPE SPEED
FOR WIDEBAND RECORDING MODE (15 IPS) OR PCM MODE (3-3/4 IPS), AND
DIRECTION OF TAPE MOTION. LOSS OF FORMAT CONTROL WOULD NOT BE
CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES:
VS72-978099
INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, SCHEMATIC
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-52
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
255
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: MADS RECORDER FORMAT CONTROL
FAILURE MODE: PHYSICAL BINDING/JAMMING
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
RECORDER FORMAT CONTROL
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL A7L
V408-78029
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
RECORDER FORMAT CONTROLS PERMIT SELECTION OF RECORDER TAPE SPEED
FOR WIDEBAND RECORDING MODE (15 IPS) FOR PCM MODE (3-3/4 IPS),
AND DIRECTION OF TAPE MOTION. LOSS OF FORMAT CONTROL WOULD NOT
BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, SCHEMATIC
VS72-978099
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-53
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
261
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REFERENCE JUNCTIONS
OPEN
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
THERMOCOUPLE REFERENCE JUNCTIONS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME476-0133-0XXX
CAUSES: PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE, MISHANDLING, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
A REFERENCE JUNCTION IS USED WITH A THERMOCOUPLE TEMPERATURE
SENSOR TO PROVIDE A REFERENCE ELECTRICAL POTENTIAL AT A KNOWN
TEMPERATURE OR SIMULATED TEMPERATURE FOR THAT THERMOCOUPLE.
LOSS OF REFERENCE JUNCTION(S) WOULD CAUSE LOSS OF TEMPERATURE
MEASUREMENT(S); HOWEVER, SUCH LOSS WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES:
978099
INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, V72-
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-54
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
262
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
REFERENCE JUNCTIONS
SHORT
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
THEMOCOUPLE REFERENCES JUNCTIONS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME476-0133-0XXX
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
REFERENCE JUNCTION IS USED TO PROVIDE A REFERENCE ELECTRICAL
POTENTIAL BETWEEN DISSIMILAR METALS AT A JUNCTION AT KNOWN
TEMPERATURE. SHORTING OF REFERENCE JUNCTION(S) WOULD CAUSE LOSS
OF CALIBRATION OF WORKING THERMOCOUPLE MEASUREMENT JUNCTION(S).
LOSS OF MEASUREMENT(S) WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR
TO MISSION.
REFERENCES:
978099
INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF, INSTRUMENTATION SFOM, V72-
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-55
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/s6
INSTRUMENTATION
263
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATION
STRAIN GAGE TRANSDUCER
LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT, OPEN, INTERMITTENT
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
S)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
STRAIN GAGE
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
VARIOUS LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT VEHICLE
ME449-0141
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, TEMPERATURE, LOSS OF INPUT, VIBRATION,
PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
USED TO MEASURE STRAIN AT POINTS THROUGHOUT VEHICLE. LOSS OF
THESE MADS STRAIN GAGE MEASUREMENTS WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS72-978099, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF,
INSTRUMENTATION SFOM
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-56
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
i1/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
264
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ACCELEROMETER
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
ACCELEROMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS : A [ ] s[ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VARIOUS LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT VEHICLE
ME449-0150-0XXX
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MISHANDLING, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE HIGH-FREQUENCY-RESPONSE ACCELEROMETERS PROVIDE
ACCELERATION/VIBRATION DATA FROM SELECTED LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT
THE VEHICLE. LOSS OF THESE MADS ACCELEROMETER MEASUREMENTS WOULD
NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS72-978099, INCO/COMM SYS BRIEF,
INSTRUMENTATION SFOM
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-57
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/s6
INSTRUMENTATION
265
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: ACCELEROMETER
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT, OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
s)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
ACCELEROMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LO CAT I ON:
PART NUMBER:
VARIOUS LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT VEHICLE
ME449-0150-0XXX
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MISHANDLING, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
THESE LOW-FREQUENCY-RESPONSE ACCELEROMETERS PROVIDE
ACCELERATION/VIBRATION DATA FROM SELECTED LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT
THE VEHICLE. LOSS OF THESE MADS ACCELEROMETER MEASUREMENTS WOULD
NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS70-780089
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-58
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3
266 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS
LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT, OPEN, INTERMITTENT OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
PRESSURE TRANSDUCERS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
VARIOUS LOCATIONS
ME449-0178-0XXX
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, LOSS OF INPUT
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
USED TO SENSE/MEASURE DYNAMIC PRESSURES AT SELECTED LOCATIONS IN
VEHICLE. LOSS OF THESE MADS MEASUREMENTS WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL
TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS72-978099
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-59
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
267
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: RADIOMETER
FAILURE MODE: LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT, OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. Wo ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
RADIOMETER
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT WING, LOWER LEFT FWD FUSELAGE
ME449-0189
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE'PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH TEMPERATURE SENSOR USED TO MEASURE TEMPERATURES OF LEADING
EDGE OF WING AND NOSE OF ORBITER DURING ENTRY. LOSS OF
RADIOMETER MADS MEASUREMENTS WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS72-978099
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-60
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
268
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATION
THERMOCOUPLE, FUSELAGE TPS
LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT, OPEN, INTERMITTENT
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9)
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
THERMOCOUPLE, TPS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
TPS, LOWER RIGHT FORWARD FUSELAGE
ME449-0204
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
HIGH TEMPERATURE THERMOCOUPLE USED TO MEASURE TPS TEMPERATURES
DURING ENTRY/LANDING OPERATIONS. LOSS OF THESE MADS MEASUREMENTS
WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS72-978099
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-61
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
269
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATION
THERMOCOUPLE, LEFT WING ELEVON
LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT, OPEN, INTERMITTENT
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9)
INS TRUMENTAT ION
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
THERMOCOUPLE, WING ELEVON
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORB IT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAr,: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
LEFT WING, ELEVON
ME449-0169
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE, THERMAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE :
HIGH-TEMPERATURE THERMOCOUPLE TO MEASURE TEMPERATURES TO WHICH
WING ELEVON IS EXPOSED. LOSS OF THESE MADS MEAUSUREMENTS WOULD
NOT BE CRITICAL TO CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISSION.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS72-978099
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-62
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
INSTRUMENTATION
270
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
OPERATION
TEMPERATURE SENSORS
LOSS OF OUTPUT, SHORT, OPEN, INTERMITTENT
LEAD ANALYST: A. W. ADDIS SUBSYS LEAD: A. W. ADDIS
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
MODULAR AUXILIARY DATA SYSTEM
TEMPERATURE SENSORS
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [
LOCATION: VARIOUS LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT VEHICLE
PART NUMBER: ME449-0160
CAUSES: MISHANDLING, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
SENSORS ARE USED AT SELECTED LOCATIONS THROUGHOUT THE VEHICLE TO
MEASURE TEMPERATURES FOR RECORDING ON THE MADS RECORDER. LOSS OF
THESE MADS TEMPERATURE MEASUREMENTS WOULD NOT BE CRITICAL TO
CREW/VEHICLE OR TO MISISON.
REFERENCES: SCHEMATIC VS72-978099
REPORT DATE 12/29/86 C-63
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
106
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A, (2)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL, 014
MAIN BUS A&B
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (2)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION: 3373AI4CB2, 15CB2
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MAIN BUS A AND B DISTRIBUTION CIRCUIT PROTECTION AND
POWER FOR DEDICATED SIGNAL CONDITIONERS OF1 AND OF4. CRITICAL
ARPCS MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY THE SUBJECT DSCs. LOSS OF
FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT MISSION IF SUBSYSTEM
MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-2
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
107
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A, (2)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL, 014
MAIN BUS A&B
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (2)
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
3373AI4CB2, 15CB2
MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MAIN BUS B AND C DISTRIBUTION CIRCUIT PROTECTION AND
REDUNDANT POWER FOR DEDICATED SIGNAL CONDITIONERS OF2 AND OF3.
ARPCS CRITICAL MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY THE SUBJECT DSCs.
LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT MISSION IF
SUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-3
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
108
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
ITEM: POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT DSC OA1, 2, 3 (3)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, SHORTED, LOSS OF OUTPUT, INDADVERTENT
OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL, 33V73A17
AFT PCA 4, 5, 6
DSCOA1, 2, 3, POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
311R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] c[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS70-974102
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE,
CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
CONTROL FOR DEDICATED SIGNAL CONDITIONERS OAI, OA2, OA3 AND NON
REDUNDANT POWER TO 6 VIBRATION MONITOR SYSTEMS AND 4 TRANSDUCERS.
CRITICAL APU MEASUREMENTS ARE PROECESSED BY THE SUBJECT DSCs.
LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT
IF SUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT
UNDETECTED.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-4
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
109
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A, (2)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
8)
9) 05-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
MAIN BUS A
PANEL 33V73AI4, 15
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/IR AOA: 3/3
3/IR ATO: 3/IR
3/1R
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI4CB3, 15CB4
MC545-0026-2050
CAUSES: VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MAIN BUS A DISTRIBUTION CIRCUIT PROTECTION AND POWER FOR
DEDICATED SIGNAL CONDITIONERS OMI AND OM2. CRITICAL APU
MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY DSC OMI. LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER
SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE IF SUBSYSTEM
MEASUREMENTS WERE OUT OF TOLERANCE AND WENT UNDETECTED.
REFERENCES:
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-5
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
ll0
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT DSC OR1 AND 2 (3)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL, 33V73A17
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS70-974102
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT POWER AND CONTROL FOR DEDICATED SIGNAL
CONDITIONERS OR1 AND OR2. LOSS OF DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW,
VEHICLE OR MISSION
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-6
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
lll
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, DSC-OL1 & 2 (3)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL, 33V73A17
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS70-974102
] B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT POWER AND CONTROL FOR DEDICATED SIGNAL
CONDITIONERS OL1 AND OL2. LOSS OF DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW,
VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-7
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
ll5
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER 7.5 A
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL 015 & 014
MAIN BUS A AND B
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5A
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
/ RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73A15CBS, 14CB4
MC454-0026-2075
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MAIN BUS A AND B CIRCUIT PROTECTION AND POWER FOR MDM
OF1 AND OF2. CRITICAL ARPCS MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY THE
SUBJECT MDMs. LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE COULD AFFECT
MISSION IF SUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT WAS OUT OF TOLERANCE
AND WENT UNDETECTED.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-8
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
ll6
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER 7.5A (2)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9)
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) PANEL
3) MAIN BUS A AND B
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 7.5A
05-6R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/2R TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
33V73AI4CB5, 16CB3
MC454-0026-2075
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MAIN BUS A AND C DISTRIBUTION CIRCUIT PROTECTION AND
POWER FOR MDM OF3 AND OF4. CRITICAL ARPCS MEASUREMENTS ARE
PROCESSED BY MDM OF3. LOSS OF FUNCTION AFTER SECOND FAILURE
COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE IF SUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT WERE LOST.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-9
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
117
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT MDM OAI, 2, 3,
CRITICALITY 3 COMPONENTS
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, SHORTED, LOSS OF OUTPUT, INADVERTENT
OPERATION, ERRONEOUS OUTPUT
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL 33V73AI7
AFT PCA 4, 5, 6
MDM OAI, 2, 3 CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS:
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL:
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA:
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO:
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] c [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS70-974102
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE,
CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT POWER AND CONTROL FOR MDM'S OAI, OA2 AND OA3.
ALL COMPONENTS ARE CRITICALITY 3 EXCEPT FOR TOGGLE SWITCH ME452-
0102-7301 WHICH IS COVERED IN MDAC ID i18. WILL NOT AFFECT CREW,
VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-10
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
118
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH, TOGGLE 3P2T
FAILS TO CLOSE, SHORTED, FAILS TO OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/1R
3/1R
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) INSTRUMENTATION
2) PANEL 33V73AI7
3) SWITCH 19
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/IR AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/IR ATO: 3/IR
LANDING/SAFING: 3/IR
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ]
LOCATION: 33 V73A17519
PART NUMBER: ME452-0102u7301
B [ P] C [ P]
CAUSES: SHOCK, VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART STRUCTURAL
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MANUAL CONTROL OF RPC'S WHICH SUPPLY POWER TO MDM'S OAI,
OA2 AND OA3. CRITICAL APU MEASUREMENTS ARE PROCESSED BY THE
SUBJECT MDMs. LOSS OF FUNCTION COULD AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE IF
SUBSYSTEM MEASUREMENT WERE LOST.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 Cull
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86 HIGHEST CRITICALITY HDW/FUNC
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION FLIGHT: 3/3
127 ABORT: 3/3
ITEM:
COMPONENTS (3)
FAILURE MODE:
OUTPUT
PCM POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, CRITICALITY 3
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION, ERRONEOUS
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
v)
8)
9) 05-62
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL, 35V73A3A7
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS70-974102
CAUSES: MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, MISHANDLING, VIBRATION,
TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT POWER AND CONTROL FOR PCM 1 AND 2. ALL
COMPONENTS IN THIS CIRCUIT ARE CRITICALITY 3 EXCEPT TOGGLE
SWITCH, ME452-0102-7303, WHICH IS COVERED IN MDAC ID 128.
NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION.
WILL
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-12
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
128
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
2/2
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
SWITCH TOGGLE, 3P3T (i)
FAILS TO CLOSE, OPEN, SHORTED
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
I) INSTRUMENTATION
2) PANEL, A3A7
3) SWITCH, $7
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 2/2 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 2/2 _OA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER:
PANEL C3
ME452-0102-7303
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, PIECE-PART
STRUCTURAL FAILURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MANUAL CONTROL AND POWER TO PCM'S 1 AND 2. SWITCH
FAILURE COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION DUE TO LOSS OF POWER TO PCM'S
1 & 2 AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF GPC DOWNLIST, OPERATIONAL
INSTRUMENTATION AND PAYLOAD DATA.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-13
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
134
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, MTU (2)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL, 33V73A13
CIRCUIT BREAKER, MTU POWER
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/2R TAL: 3/3
3/2R AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS70-974102
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT POWER AND CONTROL AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR
ESSENTIAL BUSES 1BC AND 2CA AND THE MASTER TIMING UNIT. MTU TIME
IS USED BY ORBITER FOR AUTHENTICATION OF ENCRYPTED COMMANDS; ITS
LOSS COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-14
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
164
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, PDI (2)
OPEN, SHORTED INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 05-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL 36V73AIA2
POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS70-974102
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE, CONTAMINATION,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT POWER AND CONTROL FOR THE PDI. LOSS OF POWER
AND CONTROL FUNCTIONS AND SUBSEQUENT LOSS OF PDI PAYLOAD DATA
COULD BE MISSION CRITICAL FOR PAYLOADS REQUIRING PREDEPLOY
CHECKOUT TELEMETRY DATA.
(FOR SOME MISSIONS A SPARE PDI IS REQUIRED TO BE CARRIED AS A
REPLACEMENT.)
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-15
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
176
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, OPS RCDR i, (2)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6R
PANEL, 36V73AIA3
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P] C [ P ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS70-974102
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, VIB_TION, CONTAMINATION,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT POWER AND CONTROL FOR OPS RECORDER i.
DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION.
LOSS OF
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-16
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEMANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/s6
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
177
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, OPS RCDR 2, (2)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL, 36V73AIA3
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B[P] C[P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS70-974102
CAUSES: VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, CONTAMINATION, SHOCK,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT POWER AND CONTROL FOR OPS RCDR 2.
DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION.
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LOSS OF
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-17
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
185
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/2R
3/3
ITEM: POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT PAYLOAD RECORDER (2)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, SHORT, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL, 36V73AIA3
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/2R AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ 1 ] B [ P ] C [ P]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS70-974102
_'iCAUSES: ....VIBRATION, TEMP_TURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES REDUNDANT POWER AND CONTROL FOR PAYLOAD RECORDER. LOSS
OF PL RCDR PWR/CONTROL AND CONSEQUENT LOSS OF DATA WILL NOT
AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE, BUT COULD CAUSE LOSS OF MISSION FOR SOME
MISSIONS.
REFERENCES: VS70-974102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-18
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
202
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT WBSC EQUIPMENT (i)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
s)
6)
7)
8)
9) 0S-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL, 36V73A7A2
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT (MADS)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS72-978102
CAUSES: VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE
MISHANDLING/ABUSE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES POWERAND CONTROL FOR MADS WIDEBAND EQUIPMENT AND MADS
RECORDER. LOSS OF MADS DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR
MISSION
REFERENCES: VS72-978102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-19
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
203
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: POWER DISTRIBUTION ASSEMBLY
FAILURE MODE: OPEN, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) PDA, 4OV78A190
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS72-978102
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
TEMPERATURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
MULTIPLE POWER DISTRIBUTION FROM 5 MADS BUSES VIA IN-LINE FUSES.
LOSS OF POWER AND CONSEQUENT LOSS OF MADS DATA WILL NOT AFFECT
CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-978102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-20
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
214
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT SG/PCM (I)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2) PANEL, 36V73ATAZ
3) POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT (MADS)
4)
s)
6)
8)
9) 05-6R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS72-978102
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, TEMPERATURE
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MADS BUS POWER FOR STRAIN GAGE OR PCM EQUIPMENT, SINGLE
STRING. LOSS OF MADS DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-978102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-21
INDEPENDENTORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
242
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER & CONTROL CIRCUIT, MCM (1)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9)
INSTRUMENTATION
PANEL A7A2, C3A5
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS72-978102
CAUSES: VIBRATION, TEMPERATURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES POWER CONTROL AND CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR THE MADS
CONTROL MODULE. LOSS OF POWER TO AND CONTROL OF MCM AND THE
CONSEQUENT LOSS OF MADS DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW/VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-978102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-22
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
ii/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
243
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT, ET POWER DISTRIBUTION
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
4)
S)
6)
7)
8)
9)
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) AFT AVIONICS BAY
3) MASD POWER DISTRIBUTION ASSEMBLY (PDA)
CIRCUIT, ET POWER DISTRIBUTION
05-6R
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: 02
CAUSES: TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, CONTAMINATION,
MISHANDLING/ABUSE.
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES POWER FOR ET DFI AND DEADFACE RELAYS.
CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION.
NO EFFECT ON
REFERENCES: VS72-978102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-23
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
256
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
POWER AND CONTROL CIRCUIT, MADS RCDR (i)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6R
PANEL, 36V73A7A2
POWER CONTROL CIRCUIT
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: VS70-978102
CAUSES: VIBRATION, CONTAMINATION, TEMPERATURE, MECHANICAL SHOCK
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES POWER AND CONTROL TO THE MADS RECORDER.
DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION.
LOSS OF MADS
REFERENCES: VS72-978102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-24
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
271
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A, (I)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
i) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
S)
9) 05-6R
PANEL 014
MAIN BUS A
CKT BKR, 5A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MISHANDLING/ABUSE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES MAIN BUS A DISTRIBUTION CIRCUIT PROTECTION AND POWER FOR
WATER LOOP-I INTERCHANGER FLOW SENSOR AND IMU AIRFLOW SENSOR.
LOSS OF DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-978102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-25
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
272
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM: FUSE, FPCA MN BUS A IA (I)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
1)
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6R
INSTRUMENTATION
FWD PCA-I
MAIN BUS A
FUSE, IA
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
TEMPERATURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR MAIN BUS A AND THE WATER LOOP 1
INTERCHANGER FLOW SENSOR. LOSS OF DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW,
VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-978102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-26
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
273
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
ITEM: FUSE, FPCA, MN BUS A IA (i)
FAILURE MODE: OPEN
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
S)
6)
V)
8)
9) 05-6R
FWD PCA-I
MAIN BUS A
FUSE, IA
FLIGHT PHASE
PRELAUNCH:
LIFTOFF:
ONORBIT:
DEORBIT:
LANDING/SAFING:
CRITICALITIES
HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
3/3 RTLS: 3/3
3/3 TAL: 3/3
3/3 AOA: 3/3
3/3 ATO: 3/3
3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B [ ] C [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE, VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
TEMPERATURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR MAIN BUS A AND THE IMU AIRFLOW
RATE SENSOR. LOSS OF DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW, VEHICLE OR
MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-978102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-27
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
274
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A (1)
OPEN, SHORTED, INADVERTENT OPERATION
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2) PANEL 015
3) MAIN BUS B
4) CIRCUIT BREAKER, 5A
5)
6)
V)
S)
9)
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC ABORT HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3 RTLS: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3 TAL: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3 AOA: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3 ATO: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ] B[ ] C[ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: MC454-0026-2050
CAUSES: CONTAMINATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK, MIS_DLING/ABUSE,
TEMPERATURE, VIBRATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR MAIN BUS BAND POWER FOR WATER
LOOP-2 INTERCHANGER FLOW SENSOR. LOSS OF DATA WILL NOT AFFECT
CREW, VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-978102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-28
INDEPENDENT ORBITER ASSESSMENT
ORBITER SUBSYSTEM ANALYSIS WORKSHEET
DATE:
SUBSYSTEM:
MDAC ID:
11/22/86
EPDC/INSTRUMENTATION
275
HIGHEST CRITICALITY
FLIGHT:
ABORT:
HDW/FUNC
3/3
3/3
ITEM:
FAILURE MODE:
FUSE, FPCA-2, MN B, 1A (1)
OPEN
LEAD ANALYST: T. EMMONS SUBSYS LEAD: K. SCHMECKPEPER
BREAKDOWN HIERARCHY:
l) INSTRUMENTATION
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
V)
8)
9) 0S-6R
FWD PCA-2
MAIN BUS B
FUSE, 1A
CRITICALITIES
FLIGHT PHASE HDW/FUNC
PRELAUNCH: 3/3
LIFTOFF: 3/3
ONORBIT: 3/3
DEORBIT: 3/3
LANDING/SAFING: 3/3
ABORT HDW/FUNC
RTLS: 3/3
TAL: 3/3
AOA: 3/3
ATO: 3/3
REDUNDANCY SCREENS: A [ ]
LOCATION:
PART NUMBER: ME451-0018-0100
B[ ] C[ ]
CAUSES: MISHANDLING/ABUSE VIBRATION, MECHANICAL SHOCK,
TEMPERATURE, CONTAMINATION
EFFECTS/RATIONALE:
PROVIDES CIRCUIT PROTECTION FOR MDM BUS BAND THE WATER LOOP-2
INTERCHANGER FLOW SENSOR. LOSS OF DATA WILL NOT AFFECT CREW,
VEHICLE OR MISSION.
REFERENCES: VS72-978102
REPORT DATE 12/23/86 C-29
APPENDIX D
POTENTIAL CRITICAL ITEMS
MDAC ID
115
124
125
126
128
131
132
133
ITEM
MDMS 0A1, OA2, OA3
PCMMU Format Control Switch
PCMMU Format Control Switch
PCMMU Format Control Switch
OI PCMMU PWR Switch
MTU
MTU
MTU
FAILURE MODE
Loss of Output,
Open, Shorted
Physical Binding/
Jamming
Shorted
Open
Fails to Close,
Shorted, Open
Loss of Output
Erroneous Output
Erratic Output
D-I

